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ABSTRACT
Currently, the risk analysis software SAPHIRE has 
implemented a common-cause failure (CCF) module to 
represent standard CCF methods such as alpha-factor and 
multiple Greek letter approaches. However, changes to 
SAPHIRE are required to support the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s 2007 “Risk Assessment Standardization Project” 
CCF analysis guidance for events assessment. This guidance 
provides an outline of how both the nominal CCF probabilities 
and conditional (e.g., after a redundant component has failed) 
CCF probabilities should be calculated. Based upon user-
provided input and extending the limitations in the current 
version of SAPHIRE, the CCF module calculations will be 
made consistent with the new guidance. The CCF 
modifications will involve changes to (1) the SAPHIRE 
graphical user interface directing how end-users and modelers 
interface with PRA models and (2) algorithmic changes as 
required. Included in the modifications will be the possibility to 
treat CCF probability adjustments based upon failure types 
(e.g., independent versus dependent) and failure modes (e.g., 
failure-to-run versus failure-to-start). 
In general, SAPHIRE is being modified to allow the risk 
analyst to define a CCF object. This object is defined in terms 
of a basic event. For the CCF object, the analyst would need to 
specify a minimal set of information, including: 
- The number of redundant components 
- The failure criteria (how many component have to fail) 
- The CCF model type (alpha-factor, MGL, or beta-factor) 
- The parameters (e.g., the alpha-factors) associated with 
the model 
- Staggered or non-staggered testing assumption 
- Default level of detail (expanded, showing all of the 
specific failure combinations, or not) 
This paper will outline both the theory behind the 
probabilistic calculations and the resulting implementation in 
the SAPHIRE software. 
INTRODUCTION
In an earlier paper (Smith, 1998), we described the general 
process of using a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model to 
evaluate operational events at nuclear power plants.  While the 
application of using a PRA to evaluate has increased, there are 
still analysis areas that are problematic both on the research and 
application fronts.  For example, the treatment of operator 
actions specific to event-specific context remains difficult.  
Also, of similar difficulty is the assessment of dependency 
when dealing with failed components.  It is this later issue, that 
of event-driven failures and their relationship to common-cause 
failures (CCF), which we address in this paper.
Like operator actions, CCF contributions to the overall risk 
tend to dominate.  Consequently, it is vital that the estimate for 
these dependent failure events be made to a degree 
commiserate with the application of the analysis in general.  
Thus, to support decision making, one needs to have high-
fidelity PRA calculations.  When a component fails, that failure 
provides information or evidence about the likelihood of 
system failure. 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has 
recently modified it approach to account for the dependent 
failure calculation.  Consequently, changes to the SAPHIRE 
software (developed by the NRC) are required to support 
changes outlined in the NRC’s 2007 “Risk Assessment 
Standardization Project” CCF analysis guidance for events 
assessment. This guidance provides information of how both 
the nominal CCF probabilities and conditional (e.g., after a 
redundant component has failed) CCF probabilities should be 
calculated.
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NOMENCLATURE 
P( )  =  probability 
P(A|B) =  probability of A given B has occured. 
BACKGROUND
The definition of “independence” implies that two 
redundant components, A and B, behave according to: 
P(A and B) = P(A) P(B)  ,    (1)
100% of the time.  
 To illustrate this point, we will cover a simple case of two 
components (A and B), where the probability of the 
components failing are: 
P(A) = 0.055 
P(B) = 0.055 . 
 If A and B are independent, then from Equation 1, P(A and 
B) = (0.055)(0.055) = 0.0030.  These probabilities are shown in 
the Venn diagram in Figure 1.  
Figure 1.  Venn diagram showing two failure events that are 
independent.
In the case where the failure of A and B are not 
independent (i.e., a dependence exists between the two 
components), the overlap of the two components in the Venn 
diagram changes.  If the two components are more likely to fail 
together compared to the independence case, then the overlap 
area on the Venn diagram increases.  For example, if A and B 
are not independent and have a joint failure probability P(A and 
B) = 0.1 then the Venn diagram shown in Figure 2 is 
applicable.
Figure 2.  Venn diagram showing two failure events that are 
dependent.
When components A and B are not independent, the 
equation to determine the failure of both components is: 
P(A and B) = P(A|B) P(B) = P(B|A) P(A)  (2)
 If component B is removed from service for testing or 
maintenance (i.e., not failed), then the system failure 
probability P(A and B) becomes just P(A), as illustrated in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3.  Venn diagram where component B is removed 
from service. 
However, if component B fails, then we need to condition 
on this failure. We can use Equation 2 to define the notion of a 
conditional probability: 
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P(A|B) = P(A and B) / P(B) , assuming that P(B) > 0. 
When component B is failed, this conditional probability 
above is an expression: 
P(A|B) = P(A and B) / P(B) = 0.01 / 0.055 = 0.1818 
This value (0.1818) is the relative fraction of P(A and B) 
to P(B) , or slightly above 18%. 
In order to make these kinds of conditional adjustments, 
we need to be able to modify the CCF parts of a PRA to reflect 
what is known about a component failure or inoperability.  It is 
these types of calculations that motivated the NRC to modify 
its conditional CCF calculations and embody these calculations 
into its SAPHIRE software [Rasmuson and Kelly, 2007]. 
CCF MODELING 
 The CCF calculation featured in SAPHIRE is based on the 
Basic Parameter Model.  A group of four components with a 
failure of all four components necessary was selected to 
demonstrate the calculations, but other group sizes (up to eight) 
may be specified in SAPHIRE.  
 The event failures are denoted as follows: 
I1, I2, I3, I4  Indicates the independent failure of the 
subscripted component. 
C12, C13, C14, C23, C24, C34  Indicates the common-cause failure 
of the two subscripted components. 
C123, C124, C134, C234 Indicates the common-cause failure of 
the three subscripted components. 
C1234 - Indicates the common-cause failure of the four 
subscripted components. 
 The basic parameter model for CCF analysis defines the 
following: 
 1T = I1 U C12 U C13 U C14 U C123 U C124 U C134 U C1234
 2T = I2 U C12 U C23 U C24 U C123 U C124 U C234 U C1234
 3T = I3 U C13 U C23 U C34 U C123 U C134 U C234 U C1234
 4T = I4 U C14 U C24 U C34 U C124 U C134 U C234 U C1234
where the subscript T denotes total failure from all causes for 
the i’th component. 
 The failure probability of 1T, 2T, 3T, or 4T is given by the 
following equation: 
 QT= Q1+ 3Q2 + 3Q3 + Q4
where, because of symmetry assumptions in the Basic 
Parameter Model, 
Q1 = P[I1] = P[I2] = P[I3] = P[I4]
Q2 = P[C12] = P[C13] = P[C14] = P[C23] = P[C24] = P[C34]
Q3 = P[C123] = P[C124] = P[C134] = P[C234]
Q4 = P[C1234]  . 
 The definitions of the Q values, Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4,.. Qn , are 
where the CCF models (e.g., alpha-factor, MGL, or beta-factor) 
calculations vary.  We will demonstrate just the alpha-factor 
approach since this is the model used by the NRC. 
Alpha-Factor Model (non–staggered testing) methodology 
defines the Q values in the following manner. 
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Alpha-Factor Model (staggered testing) methodology defines 
the Q values in the following manner: 
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 The expression to determine the mode of the alpha factors 
themselves is: 
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where nk is the number of observed events where k components 
fail due to CCF in a group of redundant components of size m.
This expression for the ?’s is independent of the staggered or 
non-staggered testing scheme. 
 A key to understanding the SAPHIRE CCF plug-in 
functions is to think in terms of minimal cut sets.  The 
following list contains the 15 cut sets, for the four-redundant 
component system if the success criterion is 1-of-4, that 
describe the failure of these components. 
[I1, I2, I3, I4]
[I1, I2, C34]
[I1, I3, C24]
[I1, I4, C23]
[I2, I3, C14]
[I2, I4, C13]
[I3, I4, C12]
[C12, C34]
[C13, C24]
[C14, C23]
[I1, C234]
[I2, C134]
[I3, C124]
[I4, C123]
[C1234] .
 The failure probability for the system, which we denote by 
Qs, is given in terms of the Basic Parameter Model (for 
example, see Mosleh [1998]) by: 
Qs= Q14+ 6Q12Q2 + 3Q22 + 4Q1Q3 + Q4
Q-values Assuming non-Staggered Testing  
 Calculating the Q values from the alpha factors, assuming 
a non-staggered testing scheme yields the following (the alpha 
factor values are in bold):
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 Calculating a value of Qs from the above equation yields 
the following: 
Qs = Q14+ 6Q12Q2 + 3Q22 + 4Q1Q3 + Q4
= 9.9E-34+ 6*(9.9E-3)2 * (1.99E-5) + 3*(1.99E-5)2 + 4*(9.9E-
3)* (7.95E-6) +1.59E-5
= 1.593E-5
Q Values Assuming Staggered Testing  
 Calculating the Q values under a staggered testing scheme 
yields the following: 
Q1(4) = TQ
)4(
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)4(
4?  = 0.0016*0.01  = 1.6E-5 
Where ?1 = 0.99, ?2 = 0.006, ?3 = 0.0024, ?4 = 0.0016, and QT
= 0.01 
Calculating value of Qs from the above equation yields the 
following: 
Qs = Q14+ 6Q12Q2 + 3Q22 + 4Q1Q3 + Q4
= 9.9E-34+ 6*(9.9E-32 * 2.0E-5) + 3*(2.0E-5)2 + 4*(9.9E-
3)*8.0E-6) +1.6E-5 
= 1.633E-5 
SAPHIRE 8 IMPLEMENTATION OF CCF MODELING 
 To demonstrate the CCF calculation, we will create a new 
CCF object.  We will model a system of three redundant motor 
operated valves (MOVs), represented by basic events MOV-
CC-A, MOV-CC-B, and MOV-CC-C.  The success criterion for 
this system is that two components have to work for the system 
to work.  Consequently, if two (of three) components fail, the 
system is failed. 
 The basic event representing CCF will be called MY_CCF.  
The fault tree representing the system is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Fault tree with CCF representing the example 
system.
 The basic event MY_CCF is a part of the fault tree graphic 
as shown above.  However, this is a basic event and must be 
edited.  Editing this basic event shows a screen similar to that 
in Figure 5. 
Figure 5.  Editing the CCF example event. 
 To make a CCF object, its calculation type must be set to 
“Common Cause Failure – (R).”  Once this calculation type is 
selected, the user can edit the parameters of the CCF object by 
clicking the “Edit” button or the “Model Data” tab shown in 
Figure 5.  The Model Data for CCF objects appears as shown 
in Figure 6.  For the example case, we 
need to specify the three Independent 
Failure Events (MOV-CC-A, MOV-CC-
B, and MOV-CC-C) and the CCF 
Factors.
Since we selected the alpha-factor 
model, the “factors” asked by SAPHIRE 
are alpha1, alpha2, and alpha3 (labeled 
Alpha 1, Alpha 2, and Alpha 3, 
respectively).  These factors are other 
basic events that must already exist in 
the database. 
For this example, we will assume a 
“staggered” testing scheme.  As already 
indicated, the Failure Criteria is set to 
“2.”
 The Separator character is used by 
SAPHIRE to determine the “auto 
generated” event names, as we will see when describing the 
results of the CCF calculation.  Initially, the default results are 
given as “Rolled-up,” meaning the overall CCF probability is 
returned by this object.  In this example, the overall CCF 
probability is 2.696E-5.  However, we can see the details of 
this calculation by changing the “Results Detail Level” to “Full 
Detail.”
Figure 6.  Editing the parameters of the CCF object. 
When evaluating the “Full Detail” results for this example, we 
can see the results by clicking on the “CCF Results” tab.  The 
detailed results appear as: 
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2 inputs out of 3 possible must fail - All independent only 
groups are not counted. 
# 1, 6.4500E-06, MY_CCF-AB 
# 2, 6.4500E-06, MY_CCF-AC 
# 3, 6.4500E-06, MY_CCF-BC 
# 4, 7.6100E-06, MY_CCF-ABC 
Q1 = 9.7950E-04 
Q2 = 6.4500E-06 
Q3 = 7.6100E-06 
3 * Q2 
1 * Q3 
4 permutations.
2.6960E-05 total failure value. 
 If we evaluate these results in more detail, we see the 
following: 
2 inputs out of 3 possible must fail - All independent only 
groups are not counted. 
 This line above indicates that two of three components 
have to fail to have failure of this part of the fault tree.  Also, 
that a term with ALL independent failures are not counted in 
the CCF probability. 
 Next, we see: 
# 1, 6.4500E-06, MY_CCF-AB 
# 2, 6.4500E-06, MY_CCF-AC 
# 3, 6.4500E-06, MY_CCF-BC 
# 4, 7.6100E-06, MY_CCF-ABC 
 These lines represent the “cut sets” included in the CCF 
calculation.  The first three cut sets represent a CCF of two 
components, specifically AB or AC or BC.  The last line 
represent CCF of all three components.  Their respective 
probabilities are also listed, for example the probability of 
seeing A and B fail due to CCF is 6.45E-6.  Also note the name 
of the CCF “events” listed here.  For A and B failing due to 
CCF, SAPHIRE automatically creates the name “MY_CCF-
AB” by appending the CCF basic event name with the 
separator character (“-“) and then the identifier for the A and B 
components (A and B, respectively). 
 Next, we see: 
Q1 = 9.7950E-04 
Q2 = 6.4500E-06 
Q3 = 7.6100E-06 
 These lines represent the Q1, Q2, and Q3 terms in the CCF 
basic parameter model used by the calculation. 
 Next, we see: 
3 * Q2 
1 * Q3 
 These lines indicate that we see three combinations of Q2
terms, and only one Q3 term.  Consequently, for this example, 
the full expression to determine the CCF probability is given 
by: 
P(CCF) = 3 * Q2 + Q3 = 3 * 6.45E-6 + 7.61E-6 = 2.696E-5 . 
Next, we see a line indicating how many CCF terms we are 
accounting for in the CCF calculation. 
4 permutations.
 Lastly, we see the CCF probability. 
2.6960E-05 total failure value. 
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 Note that if we set MY_CCF to have results “Rolled up” 
then only a basic event with probability of 2.696E-5 will 
appear in the fault tree cut sets, or: 
PROB/FREQ TOTAL% CUT SET     
2.696E-5 89.99 MY_CCF 
1.000E-6 3.34 MOV-CC-A, MOV-CC-B 
1.000E-6 3.34 MOV-CC-A, MOV-CC-C 
1.000E-6 3.34 MOV-CC-B, MOV-CC-C 
2.996E-5  
 However, if we allow detailed results to appear, the results 
will show all of the combinations of the CCF terms, or: 
PROB/FREQ TOTAL% CUT SET     
7.610E-6 25.40 MY_CCF-ABC 
6.450E-6 21.53 MY_CCF-AB 
6.450E-6 21.53 MY_CCF-AC 
6.450E-6 21.53 MY_CCF-BC 
1.000E-6 3.34 MOV-CC-A, MOV-CC-B 
1.000E-6 3.34 MOV-CC-A, MOV-CC-C 
1.000E-6 3.34 MOV-CC-B, MOV-CC-C 
2.996E-5  
 By having all of the detail from the CCF, the fault tree 
calculation is equivalent to having the fault tree logic as shown 
in Figure 7 and Figure 8. 
Figure 7.  Fault tree representation of the CCF module. 
Figure 8.  Representation of the CCF terms. 
CONCLUSIONS
Changes to SAPHIRE have been required to support the NRC 
CCF analysis guidance for events assessment.  Based upon 
user-provided input and limitations in the old versions of 
SAPHIRE, the CCF module calculations have been updated as 
outlined in this paper. 
The modifications to SAPHIRE 8 involved changes to 
(1) the SAPHIRE graphical user interface directing how 
end-users and modelers interface with PRA models and 
(2) algorithmic changes as required.  Included in the 
modifications are the possibility to treat CCF probability 
adjustments based upon failure types (e.g., independent 
versus dependent) and failure modes (e.g., failure-to-run 
versus failure-to-start).  Reporting capability has been 
augmented, including reports outlining the algorithms to 
be used and basic event changes. 
The extensions to the SAPHIRE 8 design related to CCF 
analysis have accomplished: 
? Transition the old SAPHIRE 7 approach to a 
new CCF construction approach 
? Modified the SAPHIRE solution to improve the 
CCF adjustments 
? Facilitate enhancements in the existing CCF 
methods 
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